Trump vs. South Africa: Who is winning the clash over ‘white genocide’?
Mayıs 29, 2025 - 20:36
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The decline of American influence in Africa is a long-term trend that largely does not depend on the administration in Washington
On May 21, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa visited Washington. The visit is significant for several reasons. It was the first time an African leader went to Washington since US President Donald Trump took office in February. Also, leading up to the meeting, there were months of ‘preparatory work’ during which Washington publicly pressured South Africa at the highest levels over accusations of “white genocide.”
South Africa was among the first countries to face direct pressure from the US. Even before tariffs were introduced or disputes with Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky occurred in the Oval Office, Trump suspended economic aid to South Africa, citing violations of the rights of the white minority and policies contrary to US interests. Secretary of State Marco Rubio subsequently declined to attend the G20 summit in Johannesburg, pointing to South Africa’s alleged anti-American stance.
In response, South Africa adopted a strategy of patient endurance. Its key economic and political role in the region prevented the US from severing ties over concerns about white farmers. Ultimately, the only tangible loss for South Africa was the reduction of American financial aid ($200-$300 million annually), a large portion of which funded various NGOs and universities – traditional opponents of the African National Congress (ANC), the largest party in the Government of National Unity (GNU).
The rest – Rubio’s comments about the G20 or Elon Musk’s ‘white noise’ – had no real, lasting impact. The expropriation law remains in place, and the lawsuit against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not been withdrawn. Trump and Musk’s gradual (at least public) distancing has also been an important factor in stabilizing relations.
Nevertheless, the influence of billionaires and close associates is still a key factor. Accompanying Ramaphosa on his trip to Washington were golf stars Ernie Els and Retief Goosen, as well as Johann Rupert – Trump’s golf partner and one of South Africa’s wealthiest individuals – the owner of the luxury goods holding company Richemont. Els, Goosen, and Rupert are not only golf enthusiasts like Trump but also represent white South Africans, who are well-respected in South Africa and have thriving businesses there.
South Africa had surely done its homework. The meeting did not end in a public spat and most commentators commend Ramaphosa for demonstrating restraint, while criticizing Trump and his team for being poorly prepared for the talks. Trump, for instance, showed images of dead bodies from the ongoing violence in eastern Congo, claiming they were white farmers killed in South Africa. However, insiders report that substantial negotiations took place behind closed doors.
It seems that Trump is satisfied with this arrangement. After failing to achieve a ‘quick victory’, he shifted to his preferred transactional approach, which Ramaphosa played into by offering potential deals. Reports indicate that the two sides discussed collaboration on supplying critical minerals and prospects for exporting LNG from the US to South Africa. These may be some of the concessions that South Africa is willing to make in the negotiations regarding tariff revisions. For instance, exporting 2 million tons of LNG per year could amount to about $1 billion annually, significantly contributing to balancing trade between the US and South Africa. Moreover, South Africa hopes to extend in some form the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which is set to expire this year.
No breakthroughs or formal agreements were announced following the talks, and it would have been premature to expect any. Both Trump and Ramaphosa managed to take something positive away from the meeting – Trump criticized Ramaphosa for “genocide against whites,” likely appeasing some radicals in his circle and among his supporters, while Ramaphosa maintained his stance on key political issues and shifted the dialogue toward bilateral trade and economic cooperation.
Ramaphosa’s success did not go unnoticed in Africa – South Africa emphasized its role as an important global player.
Gradually, the world – including Africa – is learning how to engage with Trump, who, in turn, seems to be recognizing the complexities and nuances of international affairs. It appears that during Trump’s second term, Africa will receive more attention than it did during his first term. During his previous term, he did not visit Africa, becoming the first US president since Ronald Reagan to not visit any African country; he also made several critical public remarks about Africa and its leaders. However, the US is now actively involved in mediating efforts concerning the situation in eastern Congo, continues to support the Lobito Corridor project (involving Angola, DRC, and Zambia), and is exploring the possibility of organizing a third US-Africa summit.
At the same time, the interim results of Trump’s attempts to exert pressure on Africa demonstrate that Washington has fewer levers, and perhaps less inclination to apply pressure even on developing countries. Emerging alternative centers of power – not just political, but also financial and technological – allow these nations to survive without the US.
The decline of American influence in Africa is a long-term trend that largely does not depend on the administration in Washington – particularly since US policies, especially with regard to Africa, have more continuity than one might assume.
